Negative Brief: Iran Sanctions Good

By Vance Trefethen

OPENING QUOTE 3

What you’re endorsing if you vote Affirmative: “Death to America!” 3

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / REVERSE ADVOCACY 3

We need to wait several years to see how negotiations work out. Success depends on keeping sanctions option available. 3

Sanctions should not be relaxed before Iran stops its nuclear weapons program 3

MINOR REPAIR 4

Don’t remove sanctions: Instead, make it clear sanctions will be reversed as Iran reverses its nuclear program 4

Status Quo policy will reverse sanctions as Iran makes progress 4

“SANCTIONS FAIL” RESPONSES 5

“Sanctions” didn’t fail, what failed were “Weak Sanctions.” When we did strong sanctions, Iran started negotiating 5

Sanctions made recent negotiations possible: Iran would only negotiate after they felt the impact of new sanctions 5

Sanctions are an essential part of the mix of options needed to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons 6

“EVASION” RESPONSES 6

New tougher 2012 sanctions are effective at reducing Iran’s oil trade 6

Iran sanctions have substantial global cooperation 6

Russia and China have been following UN sanctions on Iran. Nothing requires them to do more 7

“HUMANITARIAN HARMS OF SANCTIONS” 7

Iranian officials admit: Economic problems and lack of medicines are the fault of Iranian government, not sanctions 7

Minor Repair: A medical exception in the sanctions. This can be done without undermining sanctions overall 7

Medicines aren’t sanctioned and shortages are exaggerated or caused by the government itself 8

DISADVANTAGES 8

1. Risk of nuclear war with Israel. 8

Link: Relaxing sanctions means Iran will not reach agreement on nuclear issues 8

Link: Iran cheats and lies to continue its nuclear weapons research 8

Link: Iran has every intention of building a nuclear bomb 9

Link: Sanctions can lead to regime change that would stop Iran’s nuclear weapons policy 9

Link & Impact: Iran nuclear bomb would be a significant threat in the region 9

Impact: Shi’ite Apocalypse. Risk of nuclear war with Israel 10

Impact: Iran could destroy Israel with a nuke 10

“Iran is Rational” - Response: So what? That doesn’t tell us what they will do 10

2. Middle East nuclear competition 11

Link: See DA 1. Iran gets the bomb 11

Link: If Iran gets the bomb, other Middle East countries will follow. 11

Impact: Most likely outcome is regional nuclear war, even if Iran acts rationally 11

3. Iran shares nuclear technology 11

Link: See DA 1. Iran gets the bomb. 11

Link: Spiritual leader of Iran says he will share nuclear technology 11

Impact: If more nations get nuclear weapons, it’s unrealistic to think nuclear catastrophe could be avoided 12

Impact: Higher risk of terrorist group getting a nuke as more countries get nukes 12

4. Israel attacks Iran. Backing away from our hardline position frustrates Israel and motivates them to attack Iran. 12

Link: Sanctions are key to keeping Iran negotiating, which restrains Israel 12

Link & Brink: Israel is on the brink of attacking Iran – frustrated because they think the US isn’t doing enough to stop Iran’s nuclear program 13

Impact: Regional Middle East war, with hundreds of American casualties 13

5. Sanctions as an alternative to war. Without sanctions as an alternative, war becomes more likely 13

Link: Sanctions on Iran help avoid military confrontation 13

Link: Relaxing sanctions increases risk of war with Iran 13

Link & Brink: In some cases, sanctions are the only thing short of war that can change regime behavior 14

Link & Impact: Sanctions delay or block military action and war 14

OPENING QUOTE

What you’re endorsing if you vote Affirmative: “Death to America!”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani 2013.  [May 8, 2013 remarks at a campaign speech in the city of Karaj](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324635904578644333931206380.html" \t "_blank) <http://unitedagainstnucleariran.com/rouhani/in-his-own-words>

“Saying 'Death to America' is easy. We need to express 'Death to America' with action. Saying it is easy.”

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / REVERSE ADVOCACY

We need to wait several years to see how negotiations work out. Success depends on keeping sanctions option available.

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte - Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

US policy must be firmly based on the reality that it will take years to learn whether the agreement between Iran and the 5+1 can deal with the nuclear dimension, much less lead to a broader rapprochement between Iran and its neighbors and Iran and the US and other members of the P5+1. Success will require concessions on both sides as well as a willingness by the P5+1 – and especially the US - to provide real economic and political incentives to Iran. Such efforts must be backed by US willingness to fully reinstate and strengthen sanctions if Iran does not accept and enforce a meaningful full agreement.

Sanctions should not be relaxed before Iran stops its nuclear weapons program

James Phillips 2013. (senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; masters degree in International Security Studies from Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Univ) “U.S. Should Maximize Pressure on Iran at Nuclear Talks“ 18 Oct 2013 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/10/us-should-maximize-pressure-on-iran-at-nuclear-talks>

Washington should reject any agreement that does not immediately address core proliferation concerns but amounts to only a short-term cosmetic deal that fails to verifiably end Iran’s nuclear proliferation threat. The U.S. goal should be to convince Iran that it has no choice but to immediately halt its nuclear weapons efforts if it seeks to avoid escalating international sanctions and the threat of a preventive military strike by Israel or the U.S. It would be a huge mistake to squander diplomatic leverage by relaxing sanctions before Tehran takes concrete and irreversible steps to halt its nuclear weapons program.

MINOR REPAIR

Don’t remove sanctions: Instead, make it clear sanctions will be reversed as Iran reverses its nuclear program

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

In practice, these complex variables mean that the US should pursue the following options:  
- The US should do everything possible to keep UN, multilateral, and unilateral sanctions in place and react immediately if Iran does not comply with the interim agreement or negotiate and comply with a lasting agreement . The time for gradual approaches is over. If there is to be a peaceful outcome to this conflict, it must come before Iran tests a nuclear device or deploys a nuclear weapon. It must come before Israel takes preventive action, the region becomes locked into a nuclear arms race, or Iran creates a technology base so advanced that current IAEA inspection methods cannot detect a covert nuclear weapons program.   
- Make it clear that the US and its allies offer Iran incentives and halt and reverse sanctions as Iran does comply. The US should show other countries that the US and the P5+1 offer Iran real incentives to halt illicit weapons related activities, and explain and justify sanctions in terms that nations in other regions can understand. Sanctions relief is not enough. Iran needs to see that the US and the rest of the P5+1 will offer incentives in terms of fuel supplies, trade, investment, and energy development. If sanctions are the “stick”, the US must act to ensure that there are real and immediate “carrots”.

Status Quo policy will reverse sanctions as Iran makes progress

Kenneth Katzman 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 7 May 2014 “Iran Sanctions“ <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>

To some experts, the November 24, 2013, nuclear deal with the international community validated the strategy of increasing sanctions on Iran. The agreement, including the approximately $7 billion in sanctions relief during the interim period, began implementation on January 20, 2014, and provisions of several laws and executive orders were waived or suspended that day. Citing initial improvements in Iran’s economy and renewed international business contacts with Iran, some in Congress believe that economic pressure on Iran needs to increase to shape a final nuclear deal and ensure that the Iran sanctions architecture does not collapse. A comprehensive agreement, under negotiation, would undoubtedly require significant easing of U.S. and third country sanctions on Iran—particularly those sanctions imposed since 2010 and intended primarily to compel Iran to reach a nuclear agreement. The Administration has said that sanctions relief under a comprehensive deal would be implemented stepwise as Iran fulfills the terms of an agreement. The Administration has said it would work with Congress on sanctions relief, in cases where congressional action might be needed to ease sanctions.

“SANCTIONS FAIL” RESPONSES

“Sanctions” didn’t fail, what failed were “Weak Sanctions.” When we did strong sanctions, Iran started negotiating

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

Many aspects of Iran’s willingness to negotiate in November 2013 may have been driven by its internal politics and other factors. Nevertheless, the US, EU, P5+1, and other members of the international community should not forget that it was only at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 – long after it was clear that Iran was acquiring all of the technology and capability to produce nuclear weapons – that Iran’s steady progress towards a nuclear weapons capability led the US and its European allies to pass strong and comprehensive sanctions on Iran’s energy exports, ability to trade, and financial system. These sanctions did not go into full effect until the summer of 2012. Although these sanctions still had significant exemptions, it was only well after a decade of weak sanctions and failed negotiating efforts, that the US applied a strong mix of sanctions on Iranian banks, Iranian companies involved in its nuclear industry, Iranian companies involved in the petrochemical and oil industries, and non-Iranian companies that have invested or have been involved with Iran’s petrochemical industries, arms industries, transport, and precious metal trafficking. It was only then that the EU took similar measures and sharply increased its role in sanctioning Iran by imposing an embargo on Iranian petrochemical imports and a ban on European investment in Iran’s petrochemical industry. By the time Iran finally proved willing to seriously negotiate, the US had instituted four major acts sanctioning Iran, impacting hundreds of companies, people, and assets.

Sanctions made recent negotiations possible: Iran would only negotiate after they felt the impact of new sanctions

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

“This chronology shows that Iran willingness to accept an agreement only came after the impact of the new US and EU sanctions reduced Iranian energy exports and revenues, crippled foreign direct investment in Iran, and created serious banking and trade problems. It only came after Iran had to deal with the fact that the Iranian Rial had become destabilized, and has steadily fallen to record lows as currency markets have reacted to the prospect of limited foreign trade, declining Iranian reserves, declining Iranian oil income, growing problems in working with Iran’s financial system, and growing detection efforts and penalties for violating sanctions. As other volumes in this series have shown, it also only came after the Iranian government saw a major military build-up by the US and GCC states Iran did not shift its position until the new sanctions had a massive impact and a the election of a new President and shifts in the position of the Supreme Leader made a new approach to negotiations possible.”

Sanctions are an essential part of the mix of options needed to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense).; former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

However, Iran cannot develop a credible nuclear force under the terms of the interim agreement or any full agreement with the same constraints. As long as Iran faces the agreed inspection and controls on enrichment, it cannot act in ways that will prevent Israel from at least having mutual assured destruction capability and the US from deploying an effective form of extended deterrence. Iran cannot be sure that Saudi Arabia cannot match or exceed its rate of nuclear deployment. In broad terms, Iran can only “win” the kind of nuclear arms race it needs if other states do not react, and it cannot hope to violate any meaningful nuclear agreement with the P5+1 in trying to create such a force in ways that will not provide ample warning.   
Implications for US Policy  
The end result is that years of careful effort will be needed to determine whether a combination of outside sanctions and negotiations will make fundamental and lasting changes in Iran’s behavior and progress towards developing nuclear weapons. The key questions for both sides will be whether Iran is serious, and whether the US and other states seeking to make lasting changes in Iran’s nuclear programs will provide the right mix of carrots and sticks to change Iran’s behavior on a lasting basis. In summary, the US and other members of the P5+1 must do everything they can to limit Iran’s capability to improve its break out capability and prevent it from getting even one nuclear device.

“EVASION” RESPONSES

New tougher 2012 sanctions are effective at reducing Iran’s oil trade

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

A US EIA [Energy Information Agency] estimate for May 2013, indicated that,   
In 2012, Iran's exports of crude oil and lease condensate dropped to their lowest level since 1986 (see chart above) as the United States and the European Union (EU) tightened sanctions targeting Iran's oil sector. Iran's 2012 net estimated oil export revenue, at $69 billion, was significantly lower than the $95 billion total generated in 2011. Oil exports make up 80% of Iran's total export earnings and 50% to 60% of its government revenue, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. Sanctions affecting investment in Iran's oil sector have also been tightened, resulting in cancellation of new projects by several foreign companies; they also negatively affected existing projects. Following the implementation of sanctions in late-2011 and mid-2012, Iranian oil production dropped dramatically. Although Iran had been subject to four earlier rounds of United Nations sanctions, these much-tougher measures passed by the United States and the European Union have severely hampered Iran's ability to export its oil, which directly affected its production of petroleum and petroleum products.

Iran sanctions have substantial global cooperation

Kenneth Katzman 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 7 May 2014 “Iran Sanctions“ <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>

Since 2010, converging international views on Iran have produced substantial global cooperation in pressuring Iran with sanctions, including among Iran’s neighbors that are often reluctant to antagonize Iran. Some countries apparently have joined the sanctions regime primarily as a means of heading off unwanted military action against Iran by the United States or by Israel.

Russia and China have been following UN sanctions on Iran. Nothing requires them to do more

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

Russia and China’s positions regarding Iranian sanctions have been an ongoing concern to both the United States and Iran. China is Iran’s largest economic and energy partner, and their participation in a truly demanding sanctions regime would put severe pressure on Iran - a situation the Iranians have long sought to avoid. Russia has earned money from low-level trade, arms sales, and large industrial projects, including completing the Bushehr nuclear reactor. So far, Russia and China have acquiesced to numerous UN sanctions. Furthermore, China has largely abided by US and EU sanctions, lowering its imports of Iranian oil enough to be granted two sanctions waivers. However, neither Russia or China implemented any unilateral sanctions of their own, nor it is unlikely that either will implement unilateral sanctions in the future. The formal position of both Russia and China is that they will impose only those sanctions required by applicable UN Security Council resolutions but not impose any sanctions beyond those specifically mandated.

“HUMANITARIAN HARMS OF SANCTIONS”

Iranian officials admit: Economic problems and lack of medicines are the fault of Iranian government, not sanctions

Iran Daily Brief 2013. “Government is to be blamed for poor economy, not sanctions” 28 March 2013 (ellipses in original) <http://www.irandailybrief.com/2013/03/28/government-is-to-be-blamed-for-poor-economy-not-sanctions/#sthash.okkWy0KZ.dpuf> (“Majlis” is the Iranian Parliament; ellipses in original)

Mehrdad Lahuti, a member of the Majlis Development Committee, said that “The government is well aware of its weak economic performance, though it tries to ascribe that weakness to sanctions.” Lahuti criticized the government’s “incorrect” implementation of the targeted subsidies plan, saying that “When the price of foreign currencies went up, we expected more emphasis on exports but instead, there was so much emphasis on imports that domestic manufacturers were brought to their knees… The government was responsible for the rise in the price of vehicles and air travel, and lack of medicine in the market. Kamaleddin Pirmoazzen, a member of the Majlis Industries and Mines Committee, also blasted the government’s economic policies. “Not only did the government’s performance not help industries and manufacturing, it actually added to the already great number of unemployed people in the country.”

Minor Repair: A medical exception in the sanctions. This can be done without undermining sanctions overall

Siamak Namazi 2013. (Dubai-based business consultant and a former Public Policy Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars) “Blocking Medicine to Iran” NEW YORK TIMES 1 March 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/opinion/blocking-medicine-to-iran.html?_r=0>

There are solutions. With fewer than 100 American and European companies holding patents to the most advanced medicines needed, it should be possible to craft narrow exemptions authorizing Iranian and international banks to do business with those companies for the exclusive purpose of providing medication to Iranian patients without undermining the sanctions regime overall. This would mean carving out special exceptions for at least some of the 20 or so Iranian banks that the U.S. government currently blacklists wholesale, at least for the narrow purpose of purchasing medical drugs and supplies.

Medicines aren’t sanctioned and shortages are exaggerated or caused by the government itself

Kenneth Katzman 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 7 May 2014 “Iran Sanctions“ <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>

Humanitarian-related effects of sanctions have been noted in several sectors, and some of the sanctions easing in the interim nuclear deal are intended to mitigate these effects. Press reports have mounted since mid-2012 that sanctions are hurting the population’s ability to obtain Western-made medicines, such as expensive chemo-therapy medicines, and other critical goods. Some of the scarcity is caused by banks’ refusal to finance such sales, even though doing so is technically allowed under all applicable sanctions. Some observers say the Iranian government is exaggerating reports of medicine shortages to generate opposition to the sanctions. Other accounts say that Iranians, particularly those with connections to the government, are taking advantage of medicine shortages by cornering the market for importing key medicines.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Risk of nuclear war with Israel.

Link: Relaxing sanctions means Iran will not reach agreement on nuclear issues

James Phillips 2014. (senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; masters degree in International Security Studies from Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Univ.) Iran Exploits Interim Nuclear Agreement to Undermine Sanctions 21 Apr 2014 <http://dailysignal.com/2014/04/21/iran-exploits-interim-nuclear-agreement-undermine-sanctions/>

Meanwhile, the Obama Administration’s relaxation of sanctions on Iran has enabled Tehran to surge its [oil exports](http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/us-iran-oil-idUSBREA3A1R020140411) above the 1 million barrel per day average through July 20 set by the interim nuclear agreement. This undermining of sanctions makes it even less likely that the Obama Administration will be able to reach an acceptable final agreement with Iran on the nuclear issue.

Link: Iran cheats and lies to continue its nuclear weapons research

James Phillips 2013. (senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; masters degree in International Security Studies from Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Univ) “U.S. Should Maximize Pressure on Iran at Nuclear Talks“ 18 Oct 2013 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/10/us-should-maximize-pressure-on-iran-at-nuclear-talks>

Tehran’s initial acceptance and subsequent rejection of that offer is consistent with its long-established pattern of cheat, retreat, and delay on nuclear issues. When caught cheating on its nuclear safeguards obligations, Tehran has repeatedly promised to cooperate with the IAEA to defuse the situation and to halt the momentum for imposing further sanctions. Then, after the crisis is averted, it reneges on its promises and stonewalls IAEA requests for more information. These delaying tactics consume valuable time, which Iran has used to press ahead with its nuclear weapons research.

Link: Iran has every intention of building a nuclear bomb

Dr. James Carafano 2011. (PhD ; Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the Institute of World Politics and has served as a visiting professor at National Defense University; previously served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point ) “Nightmare Scenario in the Middle East as Iran Inches Closer to the Bomb” 9 Nov 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/11/nightmare-scenario-in-the-middle-east-as-iran-inches-closer-to-the-bomb>

That new report from the International Atomic Energy Agency? No big whoop. All it says is that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon. “The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device,” the report concludes. As a result, IAEA, the U.N. “watchdog” responsible for monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, now “has serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Welcome to the club, IAEA. The rest of the sentient world has known about Tehran’s “secret” program to build the bomb since 2002.

Link: Sanctions can lead to regime change that would stop Iran’s nuclear weapons policy

James Phillips 2011. (senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; masters degree in International Security Studies from Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Univ. ) Refocus on Iran: More Sanctions Needed <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/02/refocus-on-iran-more-sanctions-needed>

Sanctions can be helpful to the extent that they drive up the economic, diplomatic, and political costs that the regime must pay to continue on its present nuclear path. Although the regime is unlikely to halt its nuclear weapons program unless it is convinced that the consequences of continuing will threaten its hold on power, sanctions can also help fuel popular dissatisfaction with the regime that could eventually lead to a change of regime. Such a change would be the best possible outcome not only for American counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, and human rights goals but also for the Iranian people.

Link & Impact: Iran nuclear bomb would be a significant threat in the region

Anthony Cordesman, Bryan Gold and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte 2014. (Cordesman - Chair in Strategy at the [Center for Strategic and International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies);  served as national security assistant to Senator [John McCain](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McCain) of the [Senate Armed Services Committee](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Armed_Services_Committee) and as civilian assistant to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Secretary_of_Defense). He is also a former director of intelligence assessment in the [Office of the Secretary of Defense](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_Secretary_of_Defense). Gold - Research Intern, Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Coughlin-Schulte -  Intern at [Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)](http://www.linkedin.com/company/csis?trk=ppro_cprof).) “Iran – Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change“ Jan 2014 <http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf>

In contrast, the real world military balance would change drastically the moment Iran can deploy significant nuclear forces and they are mobile or sheltered enough to limit the risk of a successful preventive first strike. A serious Iranian force that can launch significant numbers of nuclear warheads on warning or the moment Iran is under attack, that the US and Israel cannot credibly deter or destroy, and that will have enough surviving elements to make any form of preemption extremely dangerous is a far more credible threat. The creation of such a force would also correct Iran’s greatest military weaknesses. Iran’s air force is now largely obsolete, as its surface-based air defense system. Its long-range missiles and rockets lack the accuracy and lethality to destroy key point targets and are largely area weapons that may intimate but have little strategic effect. As long as Iran remains so vulnerable to US, Gulf, and Israeli air attack; its growing asymmetric forces have limited real-world value. The US, GCC states, and Israel can escalate with precision strikes in ways that make any Iranian use of asymmetric warfare a high risk effort than may well cost Iran far more than it is worth. This is a key reason why Iran’s nuclear efforts should not be seen as irrational, a matter of prestige, or some form of military eccentricity. They make perfect sense from the viewpoint of a nation that both sees itself as under siege from the US and many of its neighbors and wants to greatly increase its influence in the region. Iran’s nuclear efforts make good sense when seen in terms of its overall military posture. It is also a key reason that the US, P5+1, and other states must be prepared to fully enforce the agreement with Iran and insist on its compliance.

Impact: Shi’ite Apocalypse. Risk of nuclear war with Israel

Dr. Louis Rene Beres 2014. (PhD; professor of Political Science at Purdue University) Iran’s strategic threat to Israel, 8 June 2014 JERUSALEM POST <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Irans-strategic-threat-to-Israel-355702>

When Iranian leaders openly proclaim their belief in the Shi’ite apocalypse, a series of final battles presumed indispensable for transforming the profane “world of war” into the sacred “world of Islam,” essential self-defense becomes a uniquely urgent Israeli concern. Even if such proclamations should turn out to be contrived or inauthentic, a fully rational Iranian nuclear adversary could still pose a very grave threat to Israel. This is because “two scorpions in a bottle” – the original J. Robert Oppenheimer metaphor of nuclear deterrence then obtaining between the US and USSR – are always apt to react precipitously in a world of organized fear and structured uncertainty. There is more to worry about here than “mere” eschatology. A rational Iranian “scorpion” and/or a rational Israeli “scorpion” could calculate that the risks of waiting passively to be struck first would actually exceed the risks of “stinging” first. However unwittingly, such altogether rational calculations could still result in a nuclear war.

Impact: Iran could destroy Israel with a nuke

C. Hart 2012. (journalist) 6 Oct 2012 On the Inevitability of a Nuclear-Armed Iran THE AMERICAN THINKER <http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/10/on_the_inevitability_of_a_nuclear-armed_iran.html> (first brackets added, second brackets in original)

[US Congressman Trent] Franks agrees with other international leaders that an Iran with nuclear capability is an existential threat to the Jewish State.  He mentioned that an Iranian Shihab missile would take only fifteen minutes to hit Israel.  If that missile carried a nuclear warhead, Israel's multi-layered anti-missile defense system would still have only a 50% chance of knocking down the first one. "It is very serious for Israel.  But I also believe it is very serious for America," Franks stated.  "One nuclear warhead would damage the Arab world, but would be devastating to Israel.  My sense is that they [Iran] would accept significant damage to themselves in order to destroy Israel."

“Iran is Rational” - Response: So what? That doesn’t tell us what they will do

Dr. James J. Carafano 2012. (PhD; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University; served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West PointDeputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ) “Rational or not, Iran is a real danger” CNN 1 Mar 2012 <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/01/rational-or-not-iran-is-a-real-danger/>

During recent congressional hearings, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been trying to explain why he told CNN's Fareed Zakaria that Iran is a "rational actor." He may be right. So what? It doesn't really help answer the question of what to do about Tehran. If you don't understand what factors an opponent weighs as important benefits and what it considers to be worrisome costs, you can't predict what a rational decision might look like to him. Moreover, if you bank on the enemy being rational - without leaving allowances that the enemy might make mistakes, stupid choices, or be at least partially influenced by emotional fervor - your forecast regarding his next steps may be way off base.

2. Middle East nuclear competition

Link: See DA 1. Iran gets the bomb

Link: If Iran gets the bomb, other Middle East countries will follow.

Dr. James Carafano 2011. (PhD ; Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies; adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the Institute of World Politics and has served as a visiting professor at National Defense University; previously served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point ) “Nightmare Scenario in the Middle East as Iran Inches Closer to the Bomb” 9 Nov 2011 <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/11/nightmare-scenario-in-the-middle-east-as-iran-inches-closer-to-the-bomb>

Analysts on the right and left agree that the most likely and immediate outcome of a nuclear-armed Iran is that many of its neighbors will follow suit. They will acquire their atomic weapons of their own as a check to Iranian power.  The problem is that after they arm themselves, the nuclear camps won’t cleanly line up into two sides. Atomic competition in the Middle East will look like a soccer game with a half dozen teams on the field, each trying to score their own goals.

Impact: Most likely outcome is regional nuclear war, even if Iran acts rationally

Dr. James J. Carafano 2012. (PhD; served as a visiting professor at National Defense University and Georgetown University; served as an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West PointDeputy Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies ) “Rational or not, Iran is a real danger” CNN 1 Mar 2012 <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/01/rational-or-not-iran-is-a-real-danger/>

Once Iran goes nuclear, there is not much hope that rationality will somehow prevail in the region. Rather, the most "rational" response from states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt would be to fast-track development of their own nuclear weapons to offset a nuclear Iran's regional dominance. Several years ago, the Heritage Foundation war-gamed this dark scenario. Participants from the Pentagon and several think tanks tried to act "rationally," yet it proved all but impossible to keep a crisis from developing into a nuclear war. So what if Tehran is rational? That in no way makes the Middle East less dangerous or more "manageable" by Washington wise men.

3. Iran shares nuclear technology

Link: See DA 1. Iran gets the bomb.

Link: Spiritual leader of Iran says he will share nuclear technology

NEW YORK TIMES 2006. (journalist Nazila Fathi) 25 Apr 2006 Iran Says It Will Share Nuclear Skills <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/25/world/middleeast/25cnd-iran.html?_r=1&>

Iran's supreme leader said today in a meeting with the Sudanese president that Iran was ready to share its nuclear technology with other countries. "Iran's nuclear capability is one example of various scientific capabilities in the country. The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its scientists," said the supreme religious leader, Ayatollah [Ali Khamenei](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/ali_khamenei/index.html?inline=nyt-per), to President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, IRNA news agency reported. Mr. Khamenei's comments to the leader of Sudan, one of the most unstable countries in Africa, came a few days ahead of the Friday deadline by the [United Nations](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/united_nations/index.html?inline=nyt-org) Security Council for Iran to suspend its sensitive uranium enrichment activities.

Impact: If more nations get nuclear weapons, it’s unrealistic to think nuclear catastrophe could be avoided

Henry Kissinger 2006. (former US Secretary of State) The New Challenges of Nuclear Proliferation, <http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual_meeting/nuclear_proliferation.pdf>

During the Cold War, a balance of terror was precariously maintained between the two superpowers. Leaders of both knew that their first imperative was to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, of which both would be the first victim. Even then, the disparity between the vast consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons on the one hand and any conceivable political outcome that could be achieved on the other hand had a paralyzing effect on decision making. The deliberate choice to use nuclear weapons in a preventive or preemptive manner defied the principles of rational conduct, since it guaranteed casualties among the civilian populations of both superpowers that were beyond comprehension. If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear weapons and major powers trying to balance their own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would be unrealistic.

Impact: Higher risk of terrorist group getting a nuke as more countries get nukes

Prof. Paul Rogers 2010. (professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, England) The nuclear-weapons risk, 15 Apr 2010 <http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/nuclear-weapons-risk>

On the first question, there is a small but definite possibility that a determined group could obtain a useable nuclear device illicitly either from a major existing nuclear state or from one of the newer powers. It is impossible to estimate the size of that risk, but it is probably the case that there was a greater danger in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even so, as nuclear weapons slowly proliferate, especially in countries with weaker security controls, then the chances of this outcome grow.

4. Israel attacks Iran. Backing away from our hardline position frustrates Israel and motivates them to attack Iran.

Link: Sanctions are key to keeping Iran negotiating, which restrains Israel

Robert Einhorn and Kenneth Pollack 2014. (Einhorn - senior fellow with the [Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/arms-control-nonproliferation" \t "_blank) and the [Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/security-and-intelligence" \t "_blank) at The Brookings Institution; former assistant secretary for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration; former Secretary of State’s special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama administration. Pollack - senior fellow in the [Saban Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/saban" \t "_blank) at the Brookings Institution; former Iran-Iraq military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.) 23 Jan 2014 „Iran Nuclear Talks Fail“ [www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/iran-nuclear-talks-fail-einhorn-pollack](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/iran-nuclear-talks-fail-einhorn-pollack)

At the same time, we need to prepare for the possibility that no agreement will be reached and Iran will attempt to turn that eventuality to their advantage. To thwart that attempt, we would have to ensure that Iran bears the onus for any breakdown of the talks. We would also want to work with Congress to adopt additional sanctions, urge key states (including Russia and China) to press Iran not to further advance its nuclear program, and convey a clear message to Iran that movement toward or across the nuclear threshold would be met by a firm international response that could involve much stronger sanctions and perhaps more coercive measures.  
**Background**  
Thanks largely to the crippling sanctions we worked hard to put in place, we were able to achieve the six-month “interim” deal that halted further progress in Iran’s nuclear program at a minimal price in terms of measures to ease sanctions. But negotiations on a final agreement may prove difficult, or even impossible, to bring to a successful conclusion. To detect and deter any Iranian decision to break out and move to build nuclear weapons, we have proposed going well beyond a freeze of Iran’s nuclear activities to a major reduction of its nuclear infrastructure, and we have sought verification measures that exceed the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. These tough proposals can help restrain Israeli public attacks, although the Israelis can be expected to strongly oppose any watering down of our positions.

Link & Brink: Israel is on the brink of attacking Iran – frustrated because they think the US isn’t doing enough to stop Iran’s nuclear program

Associated Press 2014. (journalist Tia Goldenberg) 21 March 2014 “Israel threatens to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in attempt to ratchet up international pressure on Tehran“ <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/21/israel-threatens-to-strike-irans-nuclear-facilities-in-attempt-to-ratchet-up-international-pressure-on-tehran/>

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been an outspoken critic of the international efforts to negotiate a deal with Iran. He has spent years warning the world against the dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran and fears a final deal will leave much of Iran’s nuclear capabilities intact. But since the global powers reached an interim agreement with Iran last November, Netanyahu’s warnings about Iran have been largely ignored. A frustrated Israeli leadership now appears to be ratcheting up the pressure on the international community to take a tough position in its negotiations with Iran. A front-page headline in the daily Haaretz on Thursday proclaimed that Netanyahu has ordered “to prep for strike on Iran in 2014” and has allocated 10 billion shekels (US$2.87 billion) for the groundwork. Earlier this week, Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon hinted that Israel would have to pursue a military strike on its own, with the U.S. having chosen the path of negotiations.

Impact: Regional Middle East war, with hundreds of American casualties

NEW YORK TIMES 2012. (journalists Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker ) U.S. War Game Sees Perils of Israeli Strike Against Iran, 19 Mar 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/middleeast/united-states-war-game-sees-dire-results-of-an-israeli-attack-on-iran.html?pagewanted=all>

A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on [Iran](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials.

5. Sanctions as an alternative to war. Without sanctions as an alternative, war becomes more likely

Link: Sanctions on Iran help avoid military confrontation

Robert Einhorn and Kenneth Pollack 2014. (Einhorn - senior fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at The Brookings Institution; former assistant secretary for nonproliferation in the Clinton administration; former Secretary of State’s special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama administration. Pollack - senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; former Iran-Iraq military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.) 23 Jan 2014 „Iran Nuclear Talks Fail“ [www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/iran-nuclear-talks-fail-einhorn-pollack](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/iran-nuclear-talks-fail-einhorn-pollack)

To thwart Iranian efforts to erode the sanctions regime without an agreement, we would consult actively with members of the international sanctions coalition to explain that prospects for resolving the issue diplomatically and avoiding a military confrontation depend on maintaining a united front on sanctions. We would also work with Congress to adopt additional sanctions and make the case internationally on the need for ramping them up.

Link: Relaxing sanctions increases risk of war with Iran

James Phillips 2013. (senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; masters degree in International Security Studies from Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts Univ) A Bad Nuclear Deal with Iran Could Lead to War 24 Nov 2013 <http://dailysignal.com/2013/11/24/bad-nuclear-deal-iran-lead-war/>

The Administration has resisted bipartisan congressional efforts to impose new sanctions on Iran. White House spokesman Jay Carney [has warned](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/12/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-11122013) that additional pressure on Iran could derail diplomatic negotiations and put the U.S. on a “march to war.” But as Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Peter Brookes [has noted](http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/opinion/op_ed/2013/11/bad_deal_on_iranian_nukes_may_not_torpedo_war): “On the contrary, not being tough enough on Iran—whether with new sanctions or at the Geneva talks—may actually propel the simmering crisis toward armed conflict despite intentions to do otherwise.”

Link & Brink: In some cases, sanctions are the only thing short of war that can change regime behavior

Dr. Stephen Collins 2009. (Associate Professor in the Dept of Political Science and International Affairs at Kennesaw State Univ) NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol III No 2, Spring 2009 “The Efficacy of Economic Sanctions, Economic Sanctions and American Foreign Policy in the Unipolar Era“ <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/3/1/3/pages253132/p253132-25.php>

In addition to trepidation over the economic consequences of sanctions, concerns about the power of U.N. sanctions to deeply isolate Libya from the international community appears to have persuaded the regime to reform its policies on terrorism support. Sudan made similar changes in response to diplomatic sanctions and threatened aviation sanctions. In some cases, the threat of broad sanctions may represent the only tool, short of war, that will convince the leadership of a foreign state to concede to demands for policy reform. However, in other contexts, more limited measures, with fewer potential humanitarian costs, may be enough to induce change.

Link & Impact: Sanctions delay or block military action and war

Dr. George Friedman 2009. (PhD in government, Cornell Univ.; former professor of political science at Dickinson College; founder and CEO of Stratfor, a private intelligence and forecasting company ) Sanctions and Strategy, 23 November 2009 <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091123_sanctions_and_strategy>

But sanctions have one virtue: They delay or block military action. So long as sanctions are being considered or being imposed, the argument can be made to those who want military action that it is necessary to give the sanctions time to work. Therefore, in this case, sanctions allow the United States to block any potential military actions by Israel against Iran while appearing domestically to be taking action. Should the United States wish to act, the sanctions route gives the Europeans the option of arguing that military action is premature. Furthermore, if military action took place without Russian approval while Russia was cooperating in a sanctions regime, it would have increased room to maneuver against U.S. interests in the Middle East, portraying the United States as trigger-happy. The ultimate virtue of sanctions is that they provide a platform between acquiescence and war. The effectiveness of that platform is not nearly as important as the fact that it provides a buffer against charges of inaction and demands for further action.